NAVAL REACTORS DOE DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION BULLETIN 470.3-110, REVISION 1

Consistent with the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) overall concept of operations, the following provides broad implementation guidance for Safeguards and Security Program Planning and Management for those activities under the Deputy Administrator's cognizance. This implementing guidance takes precedence over Department of Energy (DOE) Order 470.3B and guidance found in other related DOE documents.

1. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is responsible for the operation of four (4) DOE-owned facilities:

- KAPL-Kesselring Site (KSO) – Operating prototype reactor facility
- Bettis-Naval Reactors Facility (Bettis-NRF) – Expended nuclear core examination facility
- Bettis-Pittsburgh (Bettis-PGH) – Research and development laboratory
- KAPL-Knolls Site (KAPL) – Research and development laboratory

These NNPP facilities, individually and collectively, possess significant amounts of classified and sensitive information, special nuclear material (reactors and limited quantities of highly enriched uranium for laboratory research), facilities containing radioactive materials, and personnel, particularly U.S. Navy personnel, who are essential to Navy fleet operations. The mission of these facilities is critical to national defense and unique in the Department of Energy. Although the sites project low profiles in their communities and among government activities, they also represent a significant Federal government presence and are key installations in the widely recognized Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. In developing protection strategies for these facilities, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program will follow a graded approach and will categorize the facilities as reactor or non-reactor sites with greater protection afforded the reactor site.

2. The Design Basis Threat (DBT) for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program facilities are derived from threat statements applicable to similar U.S. Navy facilities and those under the license of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Specific guidance issued by Naval Reactors is included in letter B#C07-00282, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM DESIGN BASIS THREAT GUIDANCE, dated December 7, 2007.

3. The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Criteria for use in threat analysis of Radiological sabotage is:

Naval Reactors prototypes will be protected against radiological sabotage events which could reasonably be expected to cause release of radioactivity offsite in excess of the existing criteria identified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal regulations (CFR), Part 50.67.

4. Requests for waivers and exceptions to specific requirements of this Implementation Bulletin will be submitted to NR Headquarters for review and approval.

5. Oversight and evaluation of safeguards and security matters under the Deputy Administrator's cognizance will be conducted by Naval Reactors Laboratory Field Offices with additional oversight provided by NR Headquarters.